The Struggle to Feed Northern Syria

Local councils in northern Syria are continuously scrambling to feed the residents of their towns. This has provided an opening for Jihadi groups to play the role of provider. David Kirkpatrick of the New York Times published an article this past week detailing Jabhat al-Nusrah’s role in providing flour at a reduced rate to the Tilalyan local council in northern Aleppo Province. Jabhat al-Nusrah is not the only Jihadi group providing supplies to local councils.

In mid-February, the Sarmada Local Council announced that Ahrar al-Sham, a loose network of Jihadi groups that often conduct joint operations with Jabhat al-Nusrah, provided five days worth of flour to the council. The council is fortunate that is does not rely solely on Ahrar al-Sham for its flour. It also receives assistance from local merchants and reported receiving over ten days worth of flour from the National Coalition which was supplied by the UAE's Red Crescent. As with many towns, the Sarmada Local Council is endlessly searching for benefactors to get them through another week.

The UN is the international body best equipped to address the problem, but it is hampered by legal requirements. It can only enter Syria when permitted by the Assad regime and the Assad regime will only allow the UN to bring in aid through the border crossings that it controls, none of which are in Idlib or Aleppo. The UN has alternate routes into the northwest, but has only been able to make two large aid deliveries, and is facing some resentment by local opposition groups. In any case, the UN is facing a budget shortfall making it difficult to feed refugees living in UN administered camps, never mind those still in Syria.

Although the involvement of Jihadi groups in relief efforts is worrying, they are unlikely to gain the undivided loyalty of the northern Syrians by being just one of many aid providers. It will, however, complicate western efforts to isolate these groups. They not only fight well, but they are helping families eat.

The Omari Brigade, A Recipient of the External Arms Supply in Deraa

Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung published an article last week, based on research by a British blogger named Elliot Higgins as well as conversations with Arab officials, asserting that Arab states allied with the US are supplying mainstream rebel groups in the southern Syrian province of Deraa with new weapons. The article states that the effort is designed to increase the power of moderate rebel groups relative to their extremist counterparts, as well as help the rebels make a push toward Damascus, located just north of Deraa. 

Qais Qatanah (left) meeting with a
UN official

One of the rebel formations identified by Higgins as possessing the new weapons is the Omari Brigade. The Omari Battalion (later expanded into a brigade) was formed in late 2011 under the leadership of Capt. Qais Qatanah, an officer from an aerial reconnaissance unit who defected in the summer of 2011. The Omari Battalion operates out of the Lajat region, a rocky expanse in northeastern Deraa Province. Although the majority of its activities are confined to the Lajat region, the Omari Battalion’s area of operations expanded to towns just outside the Lajat in the summer of 2012, including Sheikh Miskin and Hirak.

In October 2012, the Omari Battalion expanded into a brigade which claimed 4 component battalions, all led by former officers in the Syrian military. It has continued growing in recent months as new battalions form under the Omari Brigade umbrella, including one unit claiming to operate in Damascus.

In mid-December, the Omari Brigade participated in a raid of the Brigade 34 base outside the village of Mismin in northern Lajat, just 32 kilometers from Damascus’ southern suburbs. The Omari Brigade also participated in the heavy fighting in Busir al-Harir in late-January. 

The prominence of former Syrian military officers in the Omari Brigade is significant as individuals with extremist sympathies were unlikely to rise through the ranks of Assad’s military.  There are other, more concrete signs that the Omari Brigade holds moderate views. In late January, for example, the Omari Brigade Facebook page posted an image of Capt. Qatanah meeting with an individual identified as a Christian religious leader. The post emphasized the need to respect the freedoms of all Syrian citizens.

The raid on the Brigade 34 base and the fighting in Busir al-Harir do indicate a growing capability in the Omari Brigade, perhaps attributable to new weapons. If, however, the Omari Brigade is going to play a role in cutting off Damascus from the south, to speak nothing of making a drive north toward the capital, the brigade will have to develop its ability to operate outside of the Lajat. 

1) al-Mismiya / Brigade 34 base

2) Hirak

3) Sheikh al-Miskin

4) Busir al-Harir

An apparently injured Qatanah meeting with a Christian religious figure

REVISION 03/23/2012:
In late December, 2012, officers in the Omari Brigade posted a video in which they accused Christians from the town of Mismiya of working with the regime and gave them three days to leave the town. The meeting between Qatanah and the Christian religious leader reportedly occurred after this incident. The meeting can therefor be interpreted as either a case of Qatanah reinging in his over zealous subordinates, or a case of senior FSA leaders forcing the Omari Brigade to engage in damage control, as the attempt at ethnic cleasning was used by pro-regime activists to portray the rebels as extremists.

(the above paragraph was added to the post on March 23, 2013, following the discovery of new information).

Local Governance in Sarmada

There are towns across Idlib Province that are free of any regime presence. The Idlib Revolutionary Council is reorganizing activists in these towns into Civil and Local Administration Councils (CLACs) to provide local governance until provincial wide elections can be held at some future date. This post outlines the structure and functions of the Sarmada CLAC to provide insight on the status of governance in Idlib’s liberated towns.

Sarmada’s CLAC, led by Muhamed Razi Qazah, is split into 10 committees, including:

• The Statistics Committee, which documents martyrs and tracks relief supplies as they leave storage facilities. 
• The Commission of Legitimate Rights, an independent legal body that plays a lead role in resolving conflicts. 
• The Military Liaison Committee, led by Major Mundhur Khadib, is the link between the military council and the CLAC. 
• The Security Committee is a local police force charged with organizing patrols. It can also be used by the Committee of Legitimate Rights to intervene in disputes. 
• The Foreign Relations Committee works with supporters abroad 
• The Political Media Committee coordinates with other CLACs and publicizes regime atrocities.
• The Advisory Board oversees the committees and reports any problems to the council president. The relationship between the Advisory Board and the “independent” Committee of Legitimate Rights is unclear.

Structure of the Sarmada Civil and Local Administration Council

To date, the Sarmada CLAC has publicized its role in bringing a number of services to the people of Sarmada. In December, when power shortages shut down Sarmada’s water supply, the CLAC acquired a generator to operate the town's water pump. The extended absence of government services also led to the accumulation of trash, which the CLAC began removing in early December.

As with many towns not reduced to rubble by aerial bombardment, Saramada’s 25,000 residents struggle to provide for the 10,000 refugees living among them. The Canadian humanitarian organization Human Concern has assisted in this effort by providing aid to the CLAC to distribute to Sarmada’s refugees. An Islamic community group in California has also helped by donating winter clothing.

The refugees are occupying Sarmada's schools, making it difficult for Sarmada to reactivate its education system. The CLAC has solicited the opinion of the public on how to deal with this situation. Options include removing the refugees from some of the schools into a makeshift camp or to neighboring towns, and conducting classes in local mosques. As of early December, the issue was unresolved. The presence of refugees has also raised the cost of providing bread for local residents, forcing the council to appeal to outside supporters for financial assistance.

For now, the primary problems facing the CLACs revolve around providing for the basic needs of citizens and refugees in the context of Syria’s economic collapse. If a best-case scenario emerges and the civil war ends with the fall of the Assad regime, the councils will struggle to assert themselves over the militias in order to force their disarmament. If, on the other hand, a civil war emerges between Jihadists and more mainstream rebel factions, the success of the local councils (which rely on support from abroad) could play a key role in preventing Jihadist groups from buying the support of desperate Syrians.

Who is Responsible for the Failure at Wadi Deif?

The Battle for control of Wadi Deif, a military base just east of Maarat al-Numan, began in mid-October and continues more than two months later. For some rebels, the length of the battle and the accompanying destruction of Maarat al-Numan, represents a failure. A fact finding commission published a report on the battle in early December which placed responsibility for the failures on a number of people, including a sheikh, a businessman, and a rebel leader.

Sheikh Ahmad Alwan

in Dubai in Winter 2011

The sheikh is Ahmad Alwan, a religious leader who spent the most of 2012 in the United Arab Emirates. He appeared to Maarat al-Numan in the fall and began agitating for an attack on Wadi Deif. According to the report, while some battalion leaders wanted to conduct a study on the relative capabilities of the rebel and regime forces in the area, Sheikh Alwan insisted that the rebels “have the ability to burn Wadi Deif in five hours.” Alwan was also accused of forming the Ibad al-Rahman Brigade during the course of the battle from battalions that were already associated with other brigades, creating new divisions within rebel ranks. 

Marwan Nahas, described as a businessman, is criticized in the report for not supporting the Military Council, instead focusing on creating a political party as the city was bombed. The report claims that he only appeared on the front lines for photo opportunities. Marwan Nahas and Ahmed Alwan were also accused by some residents of Maarat al-Numan of kidnapping and torture. 

Abdul Baset Maamar, a Muslim Brotherhood intermediary, was also accused of precipitating the ill-advised operation. He arrived in Maarat al-Numan in September with money from the Brotherhood, which the report alleges he used to coerce the rebels into attacking Wadi Deif, proclaiming that he would only give funds to groups that participated in the operation. 

Idlib Military Council leader Afif Suleiman was also criticized for not including the Shuhada Suriya and Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades in the battle plans in an alleged effort to control the distribution of captured material. This echoes accusations made earlier by Shuhada Suriya’s leader Jamal Maaruf. 

The struggles at Wadi Deif boil down to continuing division among rebel ranks. Although the rebels are able to launch and maintain large joint operations, their campaigns lack coherence due to competition for loot, uneven funding and, according to this report, firebrand clerics who lack an understanding of battle field realities.

    1) Maarat al-Numan

    2) Wadi Deif Military Base

The Battle for Idlib City Approaches

Syrian rebels have secured towns across Idlib province, but the provincial capital, Idlib city remains in regime hands. Although Idlib's rebels often speak of liberating the city, it appears that the battle for the city may finally be approaching. In the northwest corner of the province, a number of rebel groups led by the Shuhada Idlib Brigade have finally captured the Harem citadel, after getting bogged down in the city for two months as regime fighters stubbornly held on. Subsequently, the Shuhada Idlib Brigade released a statement announcing that the brigade would withdraw from Harem within three days and redeploy to the outskirts of Idlib city in order to focus on attacking regime checkpoints in coordination with other brigades in the area. Meanwhile, the Yusuf al-Athimah Brigade posted a statement on December 24, announcing attacks on checkpoints on the outskirts on Idlib city in preparation for the city's liberation.

Part of the drive to finally focus on Idlib city stems from the reality that there are not many other prizes left for the rebels to pursue in northern Idlib. Some Idlib rebel groups are now operating in Aleppo, such as the Idlib Tawhid Brigade, Jabhat Thuwar Saraqeb, and Shuhada Suriya, which are fighting for control of a series of regime arms depots southwest of Aleppo city in Khan al-Duman. These powerful groups will have to return of Idlib if the rebels hope to take Idlib city.

The regime’s grip on Idlib city has been firm since rebels were pushed out of the city in March. Attacks increased around the city in late summer 2012, but were limited to one-off assaults, not large scale maneuvers aimed at forcing the regime out of the city. Although the regime’s position is anchored by the Mastoumah military base located five kilometers south of the city, there is no airbase near Idlib city, leaving the regime’s supply routes vulnerable to a siege.

                                    1) Harem

                                    2) Idlib City

                                    3) Mastoumah

                                    4) Khan al-Duman

How Should Idlib's Islamists be Handled?

The Idlib Revolutionary Council held a meeting in Reyhanli, Turkey this week in which a new member was elected to the council and rules of procedure were adopted. Continuing the council’s policy of operating in the public eye, unique for political activists, videos of the proceedings were posted on YouTube. More significant, however were the rebel groups not represented at the meeting: The Idlib Tawhid Brigade, the Yusuf al-Athima Brigade, and battalions from Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham.

These are the Idlib's most Islamist groups (with the exception of the Tusuf  al-Athima Brigade whose religious ideology is unclear). A statement was posted on the Idlib Tawhid Brigade Facebook page denouncing the election for “not represent(ing) the actual revolutionary movement.” The statement claimed that the election was held “without the knowledge of these forces and without their representation.” The Yusuf al-Athima Brigade later denied being part of the statement, saying they were taking a wait and see approach to the council.

It seems that the most extreme Islamist groups are being frozen out of Idlib’s internal political process which is aimed at administering the liberated areas. This raises a familiar debate: Is it wise integrate extremists into the political process and hope that doing so moderates them, while running the risk of allowing extremist groups to dominate? Or is it better to marginalize them and prevent extremists from influencing the legitimate political process, while possibly forcing them to use violence to pursue political goals? These are questions that moderate Syrians have to address as the rebels gain decisive control over large swaths of the country.

Statement posted on the Idlib Tawhid Brigade Facebook page

The Regime's Foreign Fighter List

In late November, the Syrian government presented the UN Security Council with a list of 142 foreigner fighters killed in Syria from September through November. A week later, the Syrian newspaper al-Watan published the list. The list is by no means comprehensive, as even some foreign fighter deaths reported by regime sources did not make the list. But if one assumes that the list is representative of the total foreign fighter population (and it may not be), there are some interesting pieces of information.

Despite Saudi Arabia’s efforts to curtail the flow of its citizens into Syria, the country claims the most fighters on the list. Second on the list, and with the most fighters relative to total national population is Libya. This in not surprising given that the seized Sinjar Records documenting foreign fighters arriving in Iraq over the Syrian border also showed Saudi Arabia with the most total fighters and Libya with the most fighters per-capita. 11 Afghans made the list as well, all killed in the north. It is surprising that Afghans would be fighting in Syria given the ongoing fighting in their own country and the fact that none were in the Sinjar Records.

More surprising was the ages of the killed foreigners. The list provides ages for 51 of the 142 fighters. The average age is 39, not the young impressionable youth often pictured as international revolutionaries. The average age of the fighters in the Sinjar Records was 24 years old, more in line with expectations.

The list includes the date and location of each fighter’s death. The incident with the most foreign deaths was the rebels’ October 11 capture of a regime base at an olive oil factory in Saraqeb in which three Turks and six Saudis were reportedly killed. This may confirm the common refrain that large numbers of foreign fighters are joining Ahrar al-Sham of the Jabha Thuwar Suriya network. A number of rebel groups participated in October 11 Saraqeb raid including the Saraqeb-based Jebel Thuwar Saraqeb Brigade, Suqour al-Sham and the Iman Brigade of Ahrar al-Sham.

It is possible that these foreigners were an independent group that followed the sound of fighting, but it is also possible that they were members of Ahrar al-Sham. One video of the attack showed a fighter wearing a Shalwar Kameez, a Pakistani style of dress that has become popular among some Arab jihadists.