Housam Najjair Planning a Return to Tripoli

Housam Najjair, a veteran of both the Libyan and Syrian revolts, is preparing to reenter the fray in post-Qaddafi Libya. I spoke with Najjair recently and it was clear that he is frustrated with those who have emerged politically empowered by the revolutions. Old-guard politicians in Libya, and religious extremists in Syria.

Najjair (left) in Libya during the
revolution

Najjair, an Irish citizen of Libyan decent, is the brother-in-law of Mehdi al-Harati. Harati was the leader of the Tripoli Brigade which played a crucial role in the battle for the Libyan capital in 2011. Najjair‘s exploits as a sniper in the Tripoli Brigade were documented by journalists from France 24, bringing Najjair fame in Europe. Najjair then traveled with Harati to northern Syria where they established the Uma Brigade around Kafr Nabl. The Libyan leaders of the brigade were later prevented from reentering Syria by the Turkish government, at which point the brigade came under Syrian leadership.

After leaving Syria, Najjair returned to Ireland where he wrote a book on his experiences in Libya entitled “Soldier for a Summer.” Najjair stated that he did not write the book not to encourage young Arab males in Europe to fight against Middle Eastern dictators, but as a form of therapy to help him digest the combat experience he went through without the benefit of any real tactical training or psychological preparation. He described the flow of foreign fighters into Syria as a “bitter sweet” phenomenon. “It is a bitter feeling to have children filling the boots of the international community, and sweet because people have to much of a conscience to let this go without a response.”

Najjair (left) with Mehdi al-Harati (right)
in Syria during the summer of 2012

Najjair is highly critical of the international community’s insufficient response to the war in Syria. He believes that the diminutive flow of weapons into the country from the West has empowered extremist groups that have other, well-developed, sources of weapons. He singled out Jabhat Nusrah for criticism, asking why they are concerned with how people are dressed during a time of war. He said that these actions have caused him to “question their true loyalty.”

In Libya, Najjair feels that the country is being run by “dinosaurs” left over from the old regime. After the fall of Qaddafi, Najjair explained, the old guard politicians were worried that the revolutionaries would come looking for them to settle old scores. When this did not happen, they returned to their old professions. Najjair feels that the same people who ran the country for decades have regained power, locking out the young revolutionaries who want change.

Democracy, according to Najjair, has not succeeded in Libya. In addition to empowering the wrong people, it has fostered divisions within Libyan society at a time when unity is crucial. He said that “The unity of the revolution didn’t last a week after the fall of the regime.” 

He is also concerned that democracy will destroy Libya’s conservative culture. He fears the arrival of nightclubs and alcohol on Libya’s Mediterranean beaches. The local reaction to the recent poisoning of a number of people in Tripoli after drinking bootleg alcohol indicates that Najjair probably is correct in asserting that most Libyans would not support this, but he fears that unbridled democracy may allow it to occur nonetheless. Najjair stated that he does not favor of a Sharia state, but later said that he could support some elements of Sharia if it was necessary to protect Libya’s conservative society.

Najjair (right) speaks with NATO Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 2011

Najjair said that he plans to return to Tripoli in the near future. He wants to use his unique ability to speak to the media to build bridges and help Libya move forward. It will be interesting to see what role he comes to play in the cynical world of post-revolutionary politics.

Reports of Iranians Fighting in Syria

Reports of Iranians fighting in Syria heated up this week. First, on April 2, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that members of the National Defense Forces, a pro-regime paramilitary group, claimed that “Iranian combatants have been taking part in the Syrian conflict since approximately a month.” The members of the National Defense Forces claimed to have received training in Iran, then returned to Syria with Iranian fighters who were given Syrian I.D.s.

On April 3, Muhanad Issa, leader of the Shuhada Idlib Brigade, gave an interview on Orient TV on clashes near Idlib Province’s Shia villages of Fua and Kafaraya. In the interview, Issa claimed that his men were facing Iranian fighters. A post then appeared on Shuhada Idlib’s Facebook page in which the brigade claimed to have killed one Iranian and captured another during clashes near the Shiite villages.  In February, Ben Hubbard reported that a spate of kidnappings have been escalating between the Shia villages of Fua and Kafaraya on one side and surrounding Sunni villages such as Binnish on the other.

Muhanad Issa (left) holding the identification papers of his
Iranian hostage (right)

Later on April 3, Orient TV posted an interview between Issa and the captured Iranian. In the video, the Iranian, speaking in broken Arabic, claimed to have been in Syria for five months in order to train pro-regime fighters. 

The Shuhada Idlib Brigade clearly believes that it has captured an Iranian fighter. Given the individual's age and presence in an intense war zone, I am inclined to believe Shuahada Idlib’s claims, although it should be noted that they do not match up with the report from the National Defense Forces. Shuhada Idlib’s Iranian captive claims to have been in Syria for five months not one, and in the video Issa displays the captive’s Iranian papers. It is possible, however, that small groups of Iranian fighters have been sent to different locations at different times.

1) Maarat Misrin

2) Kafarya

3) Fua

4) Binnish

5) Taftanaz

6) Idlib City

Screen Shot of Iranian Identification papers from the interview
between Issa and the Iranian Captive

The Umma Brigade's Political Manifesto

The Syrian rebel leadership may hold more sway over the revolution's political future than the Syrian opposition's external political leadership which is falling back into disarray after showing encouraging signs of cohesion. It is therefor important to understand the rebels' political goals. Most groups have not detailed any vision for post-Assad Syria while others have given broad descriptions of the state they seek to build. The Umma Brigade, an Islamist rebel formation operating in northern Syria, is fairly unique in that they published a detailed political manifesto in December 2012.

The Umma Brigade has been widely covered in western press. It’s founder, Mehdi al-Harati, is an Irish-Libyan who participated in the Gaza Flotilla in 2010, before leading the Thuwar Libya Brigade into Tripoli in 2011. He then served as Deputy Head of the Tripoli Military Council before relocating to Syria in the spring of 2012 to found the Umma Brigade in Kafr Nabl. With funding from sheikhs in Kuwait, the Umma Brigade rapidly expanded and gained a reputation for being well supplied and trained relative to many FSA groups. The Umma Brigade is an Islamist group and has even been referred to as "Salafist" in a report published by the Idlib Revolutionary Council.

In the fall of 2012, the core of the Umma Brigade got bogged down in the fight for Wadi Deif along with many Idlib rebel groups. Around that time, the brigade’s Libyan leadership was reportedly barred from reentering Syria by the Turkish government. The brigade has since been under Syrian leadership. 

In late December, the Umma Brigade published a document entitled “a political vision for establishing a system of government.” This political manifesto laid out 25 guiding principles for a future Syrian state. Some of the significant clauses are translated below.

While this document has some relatively liberal clauses regarding religious and ethnic pluralism, it also includes deeply troubling phrases for those in favor of a secular state. For example, the first clause cites Sharia as "the reference for all state affairs," and clause 14, gives the state a role in the “prevention of vice and promotion of virtue,” a phrase often used to justify the establishment of religious police. 

While there is little risk of this document being implemented in the near term, it does provide a window into the type of constitution that Islamist rebel groups are likely to promote in the future. 

Significant Clauses:

1) “Islam and Sharia (Book and Sunna) is the reference for all state affairs including the constitutional, political, legislative, judicial, economic and media.”

2) “The People are the source of power through direct and free elections”

5) “The separation of powers between the executive, legislative, judicial and financial institutions as did the caliphs”

8) “Respect for human rights and dignity”

9) “Respect for religious and ethnic pluralism and cultural components of the Syrian people. There is no compulsion in religion, nor the persecution of minorities on the basis of religion or nationality.”

10) “The protection of individual freedoms and privacy in their homes, meetings and contacts, and no spying on them.”

12) “Justice, equality and equal opportunities for all, in public, in front of the judiciary, and in all that is shared by society, without any discrimination.”

13) “Promote the positive role of women in society, and approve all their legitimate political, social, economic, scientific and professional rights, as stated in the Hadith (women are the sisters of men).”

14) “Carry the message of Islam to the world, and the Dawa to it in everyway, in word and deed. strengthen the position of the jurists, scholars, and preachers, and provide whatever help to them in carrying out their responsibilities… and the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice…The promotion of ethical values…and protection of the family and the people, and promote science, culture, and knowledge. Care for the Arabic language and literature, connecting the nation to its religion and its faith as well as its identity, history, and civilization”

16) “Open the way for civil society to do all activity it needs, whether political, professional, cultural, or legal, by allowing the establishment of advocacy groups, charities, trade unions, and political organizations.”

18) “Protection of private property, and maintenance of public funds”

19) “Protection of agricultural, residential and pastoral land…and the distribution of land to everyone equally.”

24) “Rejection of any foreign aggression on any Islamic country. The right of the nation to resist aggression, and liberate their land…and for the district of the Zionist entity, a refusal to deal with it, and work for the liberation of the land of Palestine, and retrieval of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the right of the Palestinian people abroad return to their land, and establish their own. Reject any agreements or treaties which waive any rights of the nation to an inch of its land or interests. There is no recognition of those treaties.”

The Manifesto:

  The Umma Brigade's Political Manifesto by AB543

The Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and The Capture of the UN Troops

Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade Logo

The Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, formed in the late summer of 2012, is based around the village of Sahem in southwestern Deraa Province near the intersection of Jordan, Syria, and the Golan Heights. Although the brigade's area of operations is confined to the southwestern region, the brigade claimed to carry out a suicide attack in Busra al-Sham, far to the east, on November 18, 2012. This attack is unconfirmed.

The capture of the UN troops was not the brigade's first abduction. In late December 2012, the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade posted a video of four pro-regime fighters captured by the Golan Martyrs Battalion, a component of the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. In early February, the brigade posted another video of a pro-regime fighter captured by the Golan Martyrs Battalion. There are also reports that Human Rights Watch is investigating the brigade for executing some captives.

The UN water truck is visible in the background
of this image from a Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade
YouTube video

As of early March, the brigade is attacking regime convoys in the area of Jamla, a village only 1.5 km east of the UN patrolled border with the Golan Heights. This is occurring in the context of a larger battle against Regiment 61, located in the vicinity of the village of Maaria to the south. This battle may partly explain the capture of the UN convoy in the vicinity of Jamla. In the original statement announcing the capture of the UN troops posted on the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade Facebook page, the brigade accused the UN of bringing water and other assistance of the besieged pro-regime forces. This statement was later taken down and replaced with a new statement in which the brigade claimed to be holding the UN forces for their own protection and called on the UN to safely extract them from Syria.

Broadly speaking, the UN is not particularly popular with the rebels. In late January, the Idlib Revolutionary Council posted a statement declaring the UN unwelcome in Idlib province as a result of the UN's willingness to work with the Assad regime to get aid into Syria. 

The fact that the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade replaced the original, more hostile statement, with a far more conciliatory statement bodes well for the captured UN troops. It is a clear indication that the brigade is responding positively to the pressure it is likely receiving from actors outside Syria as well as fellow rebels in Deraa Province.

1) Sahem

2) Maaria

3) Jamla

The Second Statement

The original statement which was taken down shortly
after it was posted

The Struggle to Feed Northern Syria

Local councils in northern Syria are continuously scrambling to feed the residents of their towns. This has provided an opening for Jihadi groups to play the role of provider. David Kirkpatrick of the New York Times published an article this past week detailing Jabhat al-Nusrah’s role in providing flour at a reduced rate to the Tilalyan local council in northern Aleppo Province. Jabhat al-Nusrah is not the only Jihadi group providing supplies to local councils.

In mid-February, the Sarmada Local Council announced that Ahrar al-Sham, a loose network of Jihadi groups that often conduct joint operations with Jabhat al-Nusrah, provided five days worth of flour to the council. The council is fortunate that is does not rely solely on Ahrar al-Sham for its flour. It also receives assistance from local merchants and reported receiving over ten days worth of flour from the National Coalition which was supplied by the UAE's Red Crescent. As with many towns, the Sarmada Local Council is endlessly searching for benefactors to get them through another week.

The UN is the international body best equipped to address the problem, but it is hampered by legal requirements. It can only enter Syria when permitted by the Assad regime and the Assad regime will only allow the UN to bring in aid through the border crossings that it controls, none of which are in Idlib or Aleppo. The UN has alternate routes into the northwest, but has only been able to make two large aid deliveries, and is facing some resentment by local opposition groups. In any case, the UN is facing a budget shortfall making it difficult to feed refugees living in UN administered camps, never mind those still in Syria.

Although the involvement of Jihadi groups in relief efforts is worrying, they are unlikely to gain the undivided loyalty of the northern Syrians by being just one of many aid providers. It will, however, complicate western efforts to isolate these groups. They not only fight well, but they are helping families eat.

The Omari Brigade, A Recipient of the External Arms Supply in Deraa

Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung published an article last week, based on research by a British blogger named Elliot Higgins as well as conversations with Arab officials, asserting that Arab states allied with the US are supplying mainstream rebel groups in the southern Syrian province of Deraa with new weapons. The article states that the effort is designed to increase the power of moderate rebel groups relative to their extremist counterparts, as well as help the rebels make a push toward Damascus, located just north of Deraa. 

Qais Qatanah (left) meeting with a
UN official

One of the rebel formations identified by Higgins as possessing the new weapons is the Omari Brigade. The Omari Battalion (later expanded into a brigade) was formed in late 2011 under the leadership of Capt. Qais Qatanah, an officer from an aerial reconnaissance unit who defected in the summer of 2011. The Omari Battalion operates out of the Lajat region, a rocky expanse in northeastern Deraa Province. Although the majority of its activities are confined to the Lajat region, the Omari Battalion’s area of operations expanded to towns just outside the Lajat in the summer of 2012, including Sheikh Miskin and Hirak.

In October 2012, the Omari Battalion expanded into a brigade which claimed 4 component battalions, all led by former officers in the Syrian military. It has continued growing in recent months as new battalions form under the Omari Brigade umbrella, including one unit claiming to operate in Damascus.

In mid-December, the Omari Brigade participated in a raid of the Brigade 34 base outside the village of Mismin in northern Lajat, just 32 kilometers from Damascus’ southern suburbs. The Omari Brigade also participated in the heavy fighting in Busir al-Harir in late-January. 

The prominence of former Syrian military officers in the Omari Brigade is significant as individuals with extremist sympathies were unlikely to rise through the ranks of Assad’s military.  There are other, more concrete signs that the Omari Brigade holds moderate views. In late January, for example, the Omari Brigade Facebook page posted an image of Capt. Qatanah meeting with an individual identified as a Christian religious leader. The post emphasized the need to respect the freedoms of all Syrian citizens.

The raid on the Brigade 34 base and the fighting in Busir al-Harir do indicate a growing capability in the Omari Brigade, perhaps attributable to new weapons. If, however, the Omari Brigade is going to play a role in cutting off Damascus from the south, to speak nothing of making a drive north toward the capital, the brigade will have to develop its ability to operate outside of the Lajat. 

1) al-Mismiya / Brigade 34 base

2) Hirak

3) Sheikh al-Miskin

4) Busir al-Harir

An apparently injured Qatanah meeting with a Christian religious figure

REVISION 03/23/2012:
In late December, 2012, officers in the Omari Brigade posted a video in which they accused Christians from the town of Mismiya of working with the regime and gave them three days to leave the town. The meeting between Qatanah and the Christian religious leader reportedly occurred after this incident. The meeting can therefor be interpreted as either a case of Qatanah reinging in his over zealous subordinates, or a case of senior FSA leaders forcing the Omari Brigade to engage in damage control, as the attempt at ethnic cleasning was used by pro-regime activists to portray the rebels as extremists.

(the above paragraph was added to the post on March 23, 2013, following the discovery of new information).