The Umma Brigade's Political Manifesto

The Syrian rebel leadership may hold more sway over the revolution's political future than the Syrian opposition's external political leadership which is falling back into disarray after showing encouraging signs of cohesion. It is therefor important to understand the rebels' political goals. Most groups have not detailed any vision for post-Assad Syria while others have given broad descriptions of the state they seek to build. The Umma Brigade, an Islamist rebel formation operating in northern Syria, is fairly unique in that they published a detailed political manifesto in December 2012.

The Umma Brigade has been widely covered in western press. It’s founder, Mehdi al-Harati, is an Irish-Libyan who participated in the Gaza Flotilla in 2010, before leading the Thuwar Libya Brigade into Tripoli in 2011. He then served as Deputy Head of the Tripoli Military Council before relocating to Syria in the spring of 2012 to found the Umma Brigade in Kafr Nabl. With funding from sheikhs in Kuwait, the Umma Brigade rapidly expanded and gained a reputation for being well supplied and trained relative to many FSA groups. The Umma Brigade is an Islamist group and has even been referred to as "Salafist" in a report published by the Idlib Revolutionary Council.

In the fall of 2012, the core of the Umma Brigade got bogged down in the fight for Wadi Deif along with many Idlib rebel groups. Around that time, the brigade’s Libyan leadership was reportedly barred from reentering Syria by the Turkish government. The brigade has since been under Syrian leadership. 

In late December, the Umma Brigade published a document entitled “a political vision for establishing a system of government.” This political manifesto laid out 25 guiding principles for a future Syrian state. Some of the significant clauses are translated below.

While this document has some relatively liberal clauses regarding religious and ethnic pluralism, it also includes deeply troubling phrases for those in favor of a secular state. For example, the first clause cites Sharia as "the reference for all state affairs," and clause 14, gives the state a role in the “prevention of vice and promotion of virtue,” a phrase often used to justify the establishment of religious police. 

While there is little risk of this document being implemented in the near term, it does provide a window into the type of constitution that Islamist rebel groups are likely to promote in the future. 

Significant Clauses:

1) “Islam and Sharia (Book and Sunna) is the reference for all state affairs including the constitutional, political, legislative, judicial, economic and media.”

2) “The People are the source of power through direct and free elections”

5) “The separation of powers between the executive, legislative, judicial and financial institutions as did the caliphs”

8) “Respect for human rights and dignity”

9) “Respect for religious and ethnic pluralism and cultural components of the Syrian people. There is no compulsion in religion, nor the persecution of minorities on the basis of religion or nationality.”

10) “The protection of individual freedoms and privacy in their homes, meetings and contacts, and no spying on them.”

12) “Justice, equality and equal opportunities for all, in public, in front of the judiciary, and in all that is shared by society, without any discrimination.”

13) “Promote the positive role of women in society, and approve all their legitimate political, social, economic, scientific and professional rights, as stated in the Hadith (women are the sisters of men).”

14) “Carry the message of Islam to the world, and the Dawa to it in everyway, in word and deed. strengthen the position of the jurists, scholars, and preachers, and provide whatever help to them in carrying out their responsibilities… and the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice…The promotion of ethical values…and protection of the family and the people, and promote science, culture, and knowledge. Care for the Arabic language and literature, connecting the nation to its religion and its faith as well as its identity, history, and civilization”

16) “Open the way for civil society to do all activity it needs, whether political, professional, cultural, or legal, by allowing the establishment of advocacy groups, charities, trade unions, and political organizations.”

18) “Protection of private property, and maintenance of public funds”

19) “Protection of agricultural, residential and pastoral land…and the distribution of land to everyone equally.”

24) “Rejection of any foreign aggression on any Islamic country. The right of the nation to resist aggression, and liberate their land…and for the district of the Zionist entity, a refusal to deal with it, and work for the liberation of the land of Palestine, and retrieval of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the right of the Palestinian people abroad return to their land, and establish their own. Reject any agreements or treaties which waive any rights of the nation to an inch of its land or interests. There is no recognition of those treaties.”

The Manifesto:

  The Umma Brigade's Political Manifesto by AB543

The Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and The Capture of the UN Troops

Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade Logo

The Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, formed in the late summer of 2012, is based around the village of Sahem in southwestern Deraa Province near the intersection of Jordan, Syria, and the Golan Heights. Although the brigade's area of operations is confined to the southwestern region, the brigade claimed to carry out a suicide attack in Busra al-Sham, far to the east, on November 18, 2012. This attack is unconfirmed.

The capture of the UN troops was not the brigade's first abduction. In late December 2012, the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade posted a video of four pro-regime fighters captured by the Golan Martyrs Battalion, a component of the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. In early February, the brigade posted another video of a pro-regime fighter captured by the Golan Martyrs Battalion. There are also reports that Human Rights Watch is investigating the brigade for executing some captives.

The UN water truck is visible in the background
of this image from a Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade
YouTube video

As of early March, the brigade is attacking regime convoys in the area of Jamla, a village only 1.5 km east of the UN patrolled border with the Golan Heights. This is occurring in the context of a larger battle against Regiment 61, located in the vicinity of the village of Maaria to the south. This battle may partly explain the capture of the UN convoy in the vicinity of Jamla. In the original statement announcing the capture of the UN troops posted on the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade Facebook page, the brigade accused the UN of bringing water and other assistance of the besieged pro-regime forces. This statement was later taken down and replaced with a new statement in which the brigade claimed to be holding the UN forces for their own protection and called on the UN to safely extract them from Syria.

Broadly speaking, the UN is not particularly popular with the rebels. In late January, the Idlib Revolutionary Council posted a statement declaring the UN unwelcome in Idlib province as a result of the UN's willingness to work with the Assad regime to get aid into Syria. 

The fact that the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade replaced the original, more hostile statement, with a far more conciliatory statement bodes well for the captured UN troops. It is a clear indication that the brigade is responding positively to the pressure it is likely receiving from actors outside Syria as well as fellow rebels in Deraa Province.

1) Sahem

2) Maaria

3) Jamla

The Second Statement

The original statement which was taken down shortly
after it was posted

The Struggle to Feed Northern Syria

Local councils in northern Syria are continuously scrambling to feed the residents of their towns. This has provided an opening for Jihadi groups to play the role of provider. David Kirkpatrick of the New York Times published an article this past week detailing Jabhat al-Nusrah’s role in providing flour at a reduced rate to the Tilalyan local council in northern Aleppo Province. Jabhat al-Nusrah is not the only Jihadi group providing supplies to local councils.

In mid-February, the Sarmada Local Council announced that Ahrar al-Sham, a loose network of Jihadi groups that often conduct joint operations with Jabhat al-Nusrah, provided five days worth of flour to the council. The council is fortunate that is does not rely solely on Ahrar al-Sham for its flour. It also receives assistance from local merchants and reported receiving over ten days worth of flour from the National Coalition which was supplied by the UAE's Red Crescent. As with many towns, the Sarmada Local Council is endlessly searching for benefactors to get them through another week.

The UN is the international body best equipped to address the problem, but it is hampered by legal requirements. It can only enter Syria when permitted by the Assad regime and the Assad regime will only allow the UN to bring in aid through the border crossings that it controls, none of which are in Idlib or Aleppo. The UN has alternate routes into the northwest, but has only been able to make two large aid deliveries, and is facing some resentment by local opposition groups. In any case, the UN is facing a budget shortfall making it difficult to feed refugees living in UN administered camps, never mind those still in Syria.

Although the involvement of Jihadi groups in relief efforts is worrying, they are unlikely to gain the undivided loyalty of the northern Syrians by being just one of many aid providers. It will, however, complicate western efforts to isolate these groups. They not only fight well, but they are helping families eat.

The Omari Brigade, A Recipient of the External Arms Supply in Deraa

Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung published an article last week, based on research by a British blogger named Elliot Higgins as well as conversations with Arab officials, asserting that Arab states allied with the US are supplying mainstream rebel groups in the southern Syrian province of Deraa with new weapons. The article states that the effort is designed to increase the power of moderate rebel groups relative to their extremist counterparts, as well as help the rebels make a push toward Damascus, located just north of Deraa. 

Qais Qatanah (left) meeting with a
UN official

One of the rebel formations identified by Higgins as possessing the new weapons is the Omari Brigade. The Omari Battalion (later expanded into a brigade) was formed in late 2011 under the leadership of Capt. Qais Qatanah, an officer from an aerial reconnaissance unit who defected in the summer of 2011. The Omari Battalion operates out of the Lajat region, a rocky expanse in northeastern Deraa Province. Although the majority of its activities are confined to the Lajat region, the Omari Battalion’s area of operations expanded to towns just outside the Lajat in the summer of 2012, including Sheikh Miskin and Hirak.

In October 2012, the Omari Battalion expanded into a brigade which claimed 4 component battalions, all led by former officers in the Syrian military. It has continued growing in recent months as new battalions form under the Omari Brigade umbrella, including one unit claiming to operate in Damascus.

In mid-December, the Omari Brigade participated in a raid of the Brigade 34 base outside the village of Mismin in northern Lajat, just 32 kilometers from Damascus’ southern suburbs. The Omari Brigade also participated in the heavy fighting in Busir al-Harir in late-January. 

The prominence of former Syrian military officers in the Omari Brigade is significant as individuals with extremist sympathies were unlikely to rise through the ranks of Assad’s military.  There are other, more concrete signs that the Omari Brigade holds moderate views. In late January, for example, the Omari Brigade Facebook page posted an image of Capt. Qatanah meeting with an individual identified as a Christian religious leader. The post emphasized the need to respect the freedoms of all Syrian citizens.

The raid on the Brigade 34 base and the fighting in Busir al-Harir do indicate a growing capability in the Omari Brigade, perhaps attributable to new weapons. If, however, the Omari Brigade is going to play a role in cutting off Damascus from the south, to speak nothing of making a drive north toward the capital, the brigade will have to develop its ability to operate outside of the Lajat. 

1) al-Mismiya / Brigade 34 base

2) Hirak

3) Sheikh al-Miskin

4) Busir al-Harir

An apparently injured Qatanah meeting with a Christian religious figure

REVISION 03/23/2012:
In late December, 2012, officers in the Omari Brigade posted a video in which they accused Christians from the town of Mismiya of working with the regime and gave them three days to leave the town. The meeting between Qatanah and the Christian religious leader reportedly occurred after this incident. The meeting can therefor be interpreted as either a case of Qatanah reinging in his over zealous subordinates, or a case of senior FSA leaders forcing the Omari Brigade to engage in damage control, as the attempt at ethnic cleasning was used by pro-regime activists to portray the rebels as extremists.

(the above paragraph was added to the post on March 23, 2013, following the discovery of new information).

Local Governance in Sarmada

There are towns across Idlib Province that are free of any regime presence. The Idlib Revolutionary Council is reorganizing activists in these towns into Civil and Local Administration Councils (CLACs) to provide local governance until provincial wide elections can be held at some future date. This post outlines the structure and functions of the Sarmada CLAC to provide insight on the status of governance in Idlib’s liberated towns.

Sarmada’s CLAC, led by Muhamed Razi Qazah, is split into 10 committees, including:

• The Statistics Committee, which documents martyrs and tracks relief supplies as they leave storage facilities. 
• The Commission of Legitimate Rights, an independent legal body that plays a lead role in resolving conflicts. 
• The Military Liaison Committee, led by Major Mundhur Khadib, is the link between the military council and the CLAC. 
• The Security Committee is a local police force charged with organizing patrols. It can also be used by the Committee of Legitimate Rights to intervene in disputes. 
• The Foreign Relations Committee works with supporters abroad 
• The Political Media Committee coordinates with other CLACs and publicizes regime atrocities.
• The Advisory Board oversees the committees and reports any problems to the council president. The relationship between the Advisory Board and the “independent” Committee of Legitimate Rights is unclear.

Structure of the Sarmada Civil and Local Administration Council

To date, the Sarmada CLAC has publicized its role in bringing a number of services to the people of Sarmada. In December, when power shortages shut down Sarmada’s water supply, the CLAC acquired a generator to operate the town's water pump. The extended absence of government services also led to the accumulation of trash, which the CLAC began removing in early December.

As with many towns not reduced to rubble by aerial bombardment, Saramada’s 25,000 residents struggle to provide for the 10,000 refugees living among them. The Canadian humanitarian organization Human Concern has assisted in this effort by providing aid to the CLAC to distribute to Sarmada’s refugees. An Islamic community group in California has also helped by donating winter clothing.

The refugees are occupying Sarmada's schools, making it difficult for Sarmada to reactivate its education system. The CLAC has solicited the opinion of the public on how to deal with this situation. Options include removing the refugees from some of the schools into a makeshift camp or to neighboring towns, and conducting classes in local mosques. As of early December, the issue was unresolved. The presence of refugees has also raised the cost of providing bread for local residents, forcing the council to appeal to outside supporters for financial assistance.

For now, the primary problems facing the CLACs revolve around providing for the basic needs of citizens and refugees in the context of Syria’s economic collapse. If a best-case scenario emerges and the civil war ends with the fall of the Assad regime, the councils will struggle to assert themselves over the militias in order to force their disarmament. If, on the other hand, a civil war emerges between Jihadists and more mainstream rebel factions, the success of the local councils (which rely on support from abroad) could play a key role in preventing Jihadist groups from buying the support of desperate Syrians.

Who is Responsible for the Failure at Wadi Deif?

The Battle for control of Wadi Deif, a military base just east of Maarat al-Numan, began in mid-October and continues more than two months later. For some rebels, the length of the battle and the accompanying destruction of Maarat al-Numan, represents a failure. A fact finding commission published a report on the battle in early December which placed responsibility for the failures on a number of people, including a sheikh, a businessman, and a rebel leader.

Sheikh Ahmad Alwan

in Dubai in Winter 2011

The sheikh is Ahmad Alwan, a religious leader who spent the most of 2012 in the United Arab Emirates. He appeared to Maarat al-Numan in the fall and began agitating for an attack on Wadi Deif. According to the report, while some battalion leaders wanted to conduct a study on the relative capabilities of the rebel and regime forces in the area, Sheikh Alwan insisted that the rebels “have the ability to burn Wadi Deif in five hours.” Alwan was also accused of forming the Ibad al-Rahman Brigade during the course of the battle from battalions that were already associated with other brigades, creating new divisions within rebel ranks. 

Marwan Nahas, described as a businessman, is criticized in the report for not supporting the Military Council, instead focusing on creating a political party as the city was bombed. The report claims that he only appeared on the front lines for photo opportunities. Marwan Nahas and Ahmed Alwan were also accused by some residents of Maarat al-Numan of kidnapping and torture. 

Abdul Baset Maamar, a Muslim Brotherhood intermediary, was also accused of precipitating the ill-advised operation. He arrived in Maarat al-Numan in September with money from the Brotherhood, which the report alleges he used to coerce the rebels into attacking Wadi Deif, proclaiming that he would only give funds to groups that participated in the operation. 

Idlib Military Council leader Afif Suleiman was also criticized for not including the Shuhada Suriya and Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades in the battle plans in an alleged effort to control the distribution of captured material. This echoes accusations made earlier by Shuhada Suriya’s leader Jamal Maaruf. 

The struggles at Wadi Deif boil down to continuing division among rebel ranks. Although the rebels are able to launch and maintain large joint operations, their campaigns lack coherence due to competition for loot, uneven funding and, according to this report, firebrand clerics who lack an understanding of battle field realities.

    1) Maarat al-Numan

    2) Wadi Deif Military Base

The Battle for Idlib City Approaches

Syrian rebels have secured towns across Idlib province, but the provincial capital, Idlib city remains in regime hands. Although Idlib's rebels often speak of liberating the city, it appears that the battle for the city may finally be approaching. In the northwest corner of the province, a number of rebel groups led by the Shuhada Idlib Brigade have finally captured the Harem citadel, after getting bogged down in the city for two months as regime fighters stubbornly held on. Subsequently, the Shuhada Idlib Brigade released a statement announcing that the brigade would withdraw from Harem within three days and redeploy to the outskirts of Idlib city in order to focus on attacking regime checkpoints in coordination with other brigades in the area. Meanwhile, the Yusuf al-Athimah Brigade posted a statement on December 24, announcing attacks on checkpoints on the outskirts on Idlib city in preparation for the city's liberation.

Part of the drive to finally focus on Idlib city stems from the reality that there are not many other prizes left for the rebels to pursue in northern Idlib. Some Idlib rebel groups are now operating in Aleppo, such as the Idlib Tawhid Brigade, Jabhat Thuwar Saraqeb, and Shuhada Suriya, which are fighting for control of a series of regime arms depots southwest of Aleppo city in Khan al-Duman. These powerful groups will have to return of Idlib if the rebels hope to take Idlib city.

The regime’s grip on Idlib city has been firm since rebels were pushed out of the city in March. Attacks increased around the city in late summer 2012, but were limited to one-off assaults, not large scale maneuvers aimed at forcing the regime out of the city. Although the regime’s position is anchored by the Mastoumah military base located five kilometers south of the city, there is no airbase near Idlib city, leaving the regime’s supply routes vulnerable to a siege.

                                    1) Harem

                                    2) Idlib City

                                    3) Mastoumah

                                    4) Khan al-Duman